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INTRODUCTION
The debate concerning a national cryptography
policy and its effect on international economic
competition is raging throughout different sectors
of the country, including the halls of Congress,
the computer industry, the judiciary, organs of
the government dealing with security issues and
individual households. Why is this subject receiv-
ing so much attention? Living in the information
age, many of our most personal thoughts and
most valuable secrets are transferred from one
person or business to another via the Internet.
Because businesses and individuals are communi-
cating on-line, they demand assurance that unau-
thorized individuals cannot gain access to highly
sensitive information, be it personal e-mail or a
corporate secret. Many businesses and individuals
are therefore resorting to encryption technology
to preserve the integrity and confidentiality of in-
formation.
For businesses which conduct international
transactions, reliable and advanced security tech-
nology is necessary to prevent competitors from
intercepting confidential information. Due to Ex-
ecutive Order 13,026,' which imposes export re-
strictions on advanced forms of encryption tech-
nology, the business community has expressed
concern that transactions and information sent
via the Internet lack the security needed. The use
of encryption technology achieves that goal by
providing the desired security. The United States
I Exec. Order No. 13,026, 61 Fed. Reg. 58,767 (1996)
(explaining that President Clinton declared that new provi-
sions will be implemented with respect to the export of en-
cryption technology).
2 J. Terrence Stender, Too Many Secrets: Challenges to the
Control of the Strong Crypto and the National Security Perspective,
computer software industry is worried that billions
of dollars will be forfeited to foreign competitors
if they are not allowed to export comparable
strength encryption products. Loosening export
regulations permits the software industry to suc-
cessfully compete in this market.
This Comment suggests that the original en-
cryption policy initiated by President Clinton's Ex-
ecutive Order will be drastically altered in order
to meet the needs of the business community and
the computer software industry, while still en-
hancing national security. Part I discusses the ori-
gin and evolution of cryptography. Part II ex-
plains how various government entities have
regulated encryption software. Part III provides
law enforcement's reasoning as to why a relaxa-
tion of regulations should not take place. Part IV
focuses on how the Clinton Administration has al-
ready made concessions to the software industry
by loosening the regulations. Lastly, Part V exam-
ines why the government's policy will continue to
deregulate the export of encryption technology to
foreign nations.
I. CRYPTOGRAPHY: WHAT IT IS, HOW IT
WORKS AND WHY IT HAS BECOME SO
IMPORTANT
Encryption is one component of the art and sci-
ence of cryptography.2 Cryptography is a method
of hiding and storing information by using a code
30 CASE W. REs. J. INT'L. L. 287, 293 (1998). For a more de-
tailed discussion on the technicalities of encryption, see gener-
ally WHITFIELD DIFFIE AND SUSAN LANDAU, PRIVACY ON LINE
(1998); A. Michael Froomkin, The Metaphor is the Key: Cryp-
tography, the Clipper Chip, and the Constitution, 143 U. PA. L.
REv. 709 (1995).
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or cipher.3  The process of encryption involves
transforming an original text to an unintelligible
form, unreadable by anyone except the intended
recipient. 4 Information which has not yet been
encrypted is referred to as plaintext.5 Once en-
crypted, the text is known as ciphertext.6 Simply,
encryption is the process of securing communica-
tions and decryption is the way in which
ciphertext becomes legible to the intended recipi-
ent.
7
In order for a message to be encrypted, a math-
ematical function called an algorithm must be ap-
plied to the intended text.8 Basically, an al-
gorithm is a "set of rules or series of mathematical
steps"9 used in the encrypting and decrypting pro-
cess; it will scramble the text until the recipient
applies the corresponding key to unscramble the
message. 10 The algorithm is not what allows the
text to become secure; rather, security occurs
when the user of encryption technology selects an
individual key."I Similar to a traditional lock box
and key, a cryptographic algorithm implements a
3 See Stender, supra note 2, at 293. Cryptography dates
back 3,000 years to the Egyptians. See id. It was used mainly
for keeping military information secret. See id. Messages were
encrypted in the American Revolution, Civil War, World War
I and II. See id. Since World War II, the use of encryption
has become much more sophisticated due to the advance-
ment in computer technology. See id. See generally SAUL K. PA-
DOVER AND JAMES WESTFALL THOMPSON, SECRET DIPLOMACY:
ESPIONAGE AND CRYPTOGRAPHY 1500-1815 (1963) (providing a
more detailed explanation of both the history and technicali-
ties of cryptography).
4 FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, ENCRYPTION: IMPACT
ON LAw ENFORCEMENT at 2 (1998) [hereinafter FBI Report]
(explaining the FBI position on encryption policy and com-
menting on proposed legislation dealing with encryption in
the United States Congress).
5 See id.
6 See Stender, supra note 2, at 294 (defining various en-
cryption terms).
7 See FBI Report, supra note 4, at 2.
8 See Stewart A. Baker, Government Regulation of Encryption
Technology: Frequently Asked Questions, Sept. 1996, at 287, 290
(explaining how the process of encrypting and decrypting a
message works).
9 See Stender, supra note 2, at 294; see also High Tech Dic-
tionaiy (visited Oct. 18, 1998) <phtml?lookup=863>. Al-
gorithm is defined as a "set of instructions for solving a prob-
lem. Named after A1-Khawarizmi, an Iranian
mathematician," it is commonly used in computer program-
ming to refer to instructions given to the computer. See id.
10 See Stender, supra note 2, at 295.
11 See Baker, supra note 8, at 290. The algorithm may
either be a "secret key" or "public key" algorithm. See id. A
secret key is used for both the encryption and decryption
process. See id. The secret key is not very difficult to use and
provides reliable security, but the sender and receiver must
agree on the key before the message is sent. See id. A secret
key to encrypt and decrypt a message. 12 Once the.
sender encrypts the message and sends it, the re-
cipient must use the same algorithm to decrypt
the message.' 3
The length of the key and the complexity of the
algorithm determines the strength of the encryp-
tion algorithm. 14 The key is measured in bits, 15
and for every bit the number of possible key se-
quences is doubled, resulting in dramatically
stronger encryption as the number of bits in-
creases. 163 For example, over one trillion potential
combinations exist for a 40-bit key and more than
seventy-two quadrillion potential combinations
exist for a 56-bit key.' 7 Today, the most advanced
forms of encryption software have a key length of
1,052-bits.18
As technology advances and the need for secur-
ity persists, businesses utilize encryption software
products as a primary form of security for three
main purposes: (1) confidentiality; (2) authenti-
cation; and (3) integrity.19 Confidentiality allows
communications between individuals to become
key cannot be used to send an encrypted message to a stran-
ger. See id. The advantage to using a public key is that a
message can be easily sent to or from a complete stranger.
See id.
12 See FBI Report, supra note 4, at 2.
13 See Baker, supra note 8, at 290.
14 See Computer Science and Telecommunications
Board, National Research Council, Cryptography's Role in
Securing the Information Society (Kenneth W. Dam & Her-
bert S. Lin eds., 1996) [hereinafter NRC Report]; See also Ma-
Tram B. Dinh, The U.S. Encryption Export Policy: Taking the Byte
Out of the Debate, 7 Minn. J. Global Trade 375, 379-80 (1998)
[hereinafter Dihn] (describing the processes and purposes
of encryption).
15 See High Tech Dictionary (visited Oct. 18,1998) <http://
www.current.net/resources/dictionary/definition.phtml?
lookup=790> (explaining that a bit is an abbreviation for the
term binary digit, which is the smallest unit of information a
computer can store); see also NRC Report, supra note 14, at
354 (defining binary digit as "one of two symbols (0 and 1)
that are commonly used to represent numerical entries in
the binary number system").
16 See NRC Report, supra note 14, at 1. The report stud-
ies the effect of encryption policy on the computer software
industry, national security and individual privacy. See id. It
concludes that "U.S. policy should be changed to promote
and encourage the widespread use of cryptography." See
id.
17 See Dinh, supra note 14, at 379-80 (explaining statisti-
cal information about the lengths of algorithms).
18 Anthony Aarons, Tales from the Encrypt, Cal. Law., Apr.
1997, at 21.
19 See Baker, supra note 8, at 290; see also Dinh, supra note
14, at 379. It is estimated that by the year 2000, hundreds of
millions of people will be using the Internet and many of
these people will be conducting business transactions over on
the Internet. See Baker, supra note 8, at 290. If companies are
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and remain private. 20 Preserving confidential
communications is vital to securing business
plans, intellectual property, and other private
communications.2 1 Authentication ensures that a
particular message was sent by the stated sender.22
By authenticating a message, the probability of
forgery and repudiation is significantly dimin-
ished. 23 Certifying the integrity of a message con-
firms that a message has not been altered in any
way during transit.2 4
II PRESIDENT CLINTON'S EXECUTIVE
ORDER AND ITS EFFECTS ON
ENCRYPTION POLICY
On November 15, 1996, President Clinton, by
authority derived from the International Emer-
gency Economic Powers Act 25 and the Export Ad-
ministration Act,2 6 issued Executive Order
13,026,27 entitled "Administration of Export Con-
trols on Encryption Products." This particular Or-
der focuses on the export of encryption technol-
ogy.28 The Administration's policy originally
to operate more efficiently and provide customers with the
option to purchase products via the Internet, the buyer and
seller must be assured that each and every transaction is se-
cure. See Dinh supra note 14 at 379.
20 Cf id. (explaining that many individuals conducting
business and communications over the Internet do not want
others to be privy to such information).
21 See id. at 290 (claiming that providing confidentiality is
essential to commercial success).
22 See Baker, supra note 8 at 290 (stating that if a message
is authenticated, then the sender cannot deny that he sent
the message).
23 See id.
24 See id. Testing the integrity of a message sent via the
Internet is comparable to checking whether or not an envel-
ope has been opened during its delivery. Id.
25 50 U.S.C. ' 1702 (a)(1)(B) (1996). The International
Emergency Economic Powers Act extends power to the Presi-
dent to "investigate, regulate, direct and compel, nullify,
void, prevent or prohibit any ... importation or exportation
of, or dealing in, or exercising any right, power, or privilege
with respect to, or transactions involving, any property in
which any foreign country or a national thereof has any inter-
est." Id.
26 Export Administration Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-72,
93 Stat. 503 (codified as amended in 50 U.S.C. app. §' 2401-
20 (1994)). The act is based on legislation passed in 1949
that had the primary purpose of blocking exports that may
have benefited the former Soviet Union and the expansion
of communism. Id. The Export Administration Act ("EAA")
was rewritten in 1979 and provided the President with the
authority to impose export controls in order to achieve for-
eign policy goals. Id. Congress once again rewrote the EEA
in 1996, placing new emphasis on "controlling the export of
sensitive items .... " Id. The law reflects a shift from fighting
deemed the export of data scrambling technology
to be a serious threat to national security and for-
eign policy. 29 The Order authorizes the Secretary
of Commerce to issue licenses to manufacturers
of encryption technology on a case-by-case basis.30
In addition, the Order promotes the use of a key
recovery management infrastructure - a long-
standing cornerstone of the government's pol-
icy. 31
A. Key Escrow Systems
The Clinton Administration proposed a key re-
covery or key escrow system 3 2 as a way to balance
the "needs for information security against the
needs of law enforcement and to a lesser extent
national security. '33 Key escrow encryption sys-
tems provide encryption key codes to a trusted
third party that stores the keys for the users of
such technology. 34 These codes allow the holder
of the keys to decrypt any encrypted message. 5
Under this law, encryption key codes on all en-
cryption software shipped internationally would
communism to post Cold-War matters such as non-prolifera-
tion of weapons of mass destruction and counter terrorism
objectives. Id.
27 See Exec. Order No. 13,026, supra note 1, at 58,767.
28 See Memorandum on Encryption Export Policy, Nov.
15, 1996, at 2397 (concluding that the use of encryption
technology can jeopardize the safety of U.S. citizens).
29 See Exec. Order No. 13,026, supra note 1, at 58,767
(explaining that the Secretary may look at foreign availability
of comparable encryption products to determine whether a
license should be issued).
30 See id.
31 See id. See also Baker, supra note 8, at 292 (explaining
that the government promotes escrow encryption because it
is easier for the government to gain access to decryption keys
once authorized by a court order); see also The Risks of Key
Recovery, Key Escrow, Trusted Third Party and Encryption 4
(visited Nov. 2, 1998) <http://www.cdt.org/crypto/risks98/>
[hereinafter The Risks of Key Recovery] (explaining that key
escrow systems contain a mechanism for obtaining access to
the plaintext of an encrypted file).
32 See generally Dinh, supra note 14, at 380
33 See NRC Report, supra note 14, at 167.
34 See Stender, supra note 3, at 298. A trusted third party
may be a bank, private company, or other entity that meets
certain statutory standards. Id. These standards require that
the trusted third party not have a criminal history or pending
criminal charges, must not have ever breached any fiduciary
duty owed to another, and must not have a poor credit his-
tory. See also Dinh, supra note 14, at 380 n.41; 15 C.F.R.
§ 742 Supp. 5 (1997) (giving the exact statutory require-
ments); The Risks of Key Recovery, supra note 31, at 10 (cri-
tiquing the trusted third party policy).
-5 See NRC Report, supra note 14, at 167-68.
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be provided to the trusted third parties. 36 These
third parties could release the codes to predeter-
mined authorized parties37 or to law enforcement
officials who have obtained a valid court order.38
B. Transition from the Munitions List to the
Commerce Control List
In the past, the Department of State ("DoS")
regulated encryption exports39 under the author-
ity of the Arms Export Control Act 4°1 and Interna-
tional Traffic in Arms Regulations ("ITAR").41
Encryption software was specifically placed on the
United States Munitions List ("USML") due to the
nature of the product.42 Commercial products us-
ing encryption technology were placed on the
USML because such items were considered to be
used primarily for military purposes.43  Other
items on the USML include bombs, 44 grenades, 45
torpedoes, 46 ballistic missiles, 4 7 warships, 48
tanks,4 9 military aircraft,50 and rockets. 51 The
USML did not differentiate technically between
encryption software used solely for military pur-
36 See Dinh, supra note 14, at 380-81 (describing the char-
acteristics of the trusted third party).
37 See Stender, supra note 3, at 298.
38 See Dinh, supra note 14, at 381 (explaining the require-
ments needed to recover a key).
-0 See 22 C.F.R. § 120.1 (1997).
40 22 U.S.C. § 2778 (1994).
41 See 22 C.F.R pts. 120-30 (1997).
42 See 22 C.F.R. § 121.1 (1997). The United States Muni-
tions List is part of the secondary regulations of the Interna-
tional Traffic in Arms Regulations that define which defense
articles and services are subject to licensing. Id. The USML
was established by Section 38 of Arms Export Control Act to
advance "world peace and the security and foreign policy of
the United States." 22 U.S.C. § 2778(a)(1) (1994). The
USML definition of encryption is "(s)peech scramblers, cryp-
tographic devices (encoding and decoding), and specifically
designed components thereof, ancillary equipment, and es-
pecially devised protective apparatuses for such devices, com-
ponents and equipment." 22 C.F.R. § 121.01 (1970).
43 See Baker, supra note 8, at 293. Cryptographic technol-
ogy and components thereof are used to keep information
secret. See id. Government regulations considered this tech-
nology a threat to national security. See id. Because of such
rationale, the government put all forms of encryption tech-
nology on the USML, even if it was being used for legitimate
business purposes. See id; see also Encryption Items Trans-
ferred From the U.S. Munitions List to the Commerce Con-
trol List, 61 Fed. Reg. 68,572 (1996) [hereinafter Encryption
Items Transferred] (discussing the rationale for the shift in
oversight authority).
44 See 22 C.F.R. § 121.1 Category IV(a) (1997).
45 See id.
46 See id.
47 See id. § 121.1 Category IV(b).
48 See id. § 121.1 Category VI(a).
poses and dual-use encryption software used for
business and personal security purposes. 52 Execu-
tive Order 13,026 transferred jurisdiction over
dual-use5 3 encryption software from the DoS to
both the Commerce Department 54 and the De-
partment of State's, Office of Defense Trade Con-
trol The DoS, however, still regulates encryption
software designed primarily for military applica-
tion.55
The Bureau of Export Administration ("BXA"),
a division of the Department of Commerce,56 now
regulates dual-use encryption software and places
such software on the Commerce Control List. 57
The BXA "administers and enforces laws and reg-
ulations that govern exports of dual-use commodi-
ties, technology and software from the United
States and its territories and reexports of such
items from third countries. '58 The BXA is also
the agency responsible for the administration of
President Clinton's encryption policy. 59
The Commerce Control List ("CCL") specifies
all "the commodities, software and technical data
that are subject to export control."60 The CCL is
49 See id. § 121.1 Category VII(b).
50 See id. § 121.1 Category VIII(a).
51 See id. § 121.1 Category Iv(a).
52 SeeW. Clark McFadden II & David Bentley, Evolution of
Encyption Controls: Can They Respond to Current Trends?, 1997,
at 489; 495 PLI Patents, Copyright and Traditional Course
Series (explaining that any substantive change in the way en-
cryption technology is categorized is handled by the DoC
through the application of the EAR).
51 See JEFFERY H. MATSUURA & GEORGE B. DELTA, Export
Controls on the Internet, 10 No.3J. Proprietary Rts. 2, 3 (1998)
(defining dual-use technologies as those which serve both
military and non-military purposes).
54 See Encryption Items Transferred, supra note 43, 61
Fed. Reg. at 68,572.
55 See 22 C.F.R. § 120.3 to .4 (1997) (stating that criteria
used to determine whether or not encryption technology is
used for primarily military application includes the intent of
the design, the sponsor of the originating research and devel-
opment, the configuration or use of military specifications,
nomenclature (military or civilian), and application).
56 See Encryption Items Transferred, supra note 43, 61
Fed. Reg. at 68,572-87.
57 See 15 C.F.R. § 774, Supp. 1 (1997); see also NRC Re-
port, supra note 14, at 118-19 (describing the major differ-
ences between the USML and the CCL).
58 See Bureau of Export Administration, 1997 Annual Re-
port 1-1 (1998).
59 See id.
1) Charles L. Evans, U.S. Export Control of Encyption
Software: Efforts to Protect National Security Threaten the U.S.
Software Industiy's Ability to Compete in Foreign Markets, 19 N.C.
J. INT'L & COMM. REG. 469, 475 (citing John F. McKenzie,
Implementation of the Core List of Export Controls: Com-
puter and Software Controls, 5 SovrwARE L.J. 1, 3 (1992)).
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divided into ten general categories and numerous
sub-categories. 6' As of March 1998, the Com-
merce Control List included over 200 sub-catego-
ries of controlled goods and approximately
100,000 specific goods. 62
C. The Meaning of President Clinton's
Executive Order as Implemented Through
the BXA
The President's Executive Order set out the
policy towards the exportation of encryption
software through a rule which "require [d] a BXA
license for the export of dual-use encryption
software, hardware and technology to all destina-
tions except Canada. ' 63 The licensing policy was
divided into four distinct groups. 64 The first
group dealt with the distribution of mass-market 65
encryption software. 66 In order to obtain a li-
cense, the BXA must have conducted a one-time
review of the software. 6 7 Only 40-bit encryption
software was eligible for such a license after a
seven day review under this policy.68
The second group represented the exportation
requirements of key escrow or key recovery
software and commodities. 69 Similar to the first
group, this software was subject to a one-time re-
view by the BXA in order to receive its license. 70
61 See 15 C.F.R. § 738.2 (1997) (dividing the ten general
categories: nuclear materials, materials, materials processing,
electronics, computers, telecommunications and information
security, lasers and sensors, navigation and avionics, marine,
and propulsion systems).
62 See Matsuura and Delta, supra note 53, at 3.
63 Encryption Products Transferred to the Commerce Control
List (visited Sept. 13, 1998) <http://www.ffhsj.com/
firmpage/cmemos/0096941 .htm>.
64 See Encryption Items Transferred, 61 Fed. Reg. at
68,573; see generally NRC Report, supra note 14, at 113-165
(detailing the history and effectiveness of export controls on
cryptography).
65 Guidelines for Submitting a Classification Request for
a Mass Market Software Product that Contains Encryption, 15
C.F.R. pt. 742, Supp.6 (a) (1) (i) (ii) (iii) (1997) (defining mass
market as software which is available to the public through
retailers in over-the-counter or similar transactions, designed
for user installation without substantial supplier support and
includes encryption for the purpose of "data confidential-
ity").
66 See Encryption Items Transferred, 61 Fed. Reg. at
68,573.
67 See id. (explaining the procedure one must follow in
order to receive a license to export encryption software from
the government).
68 See id. at 68,574; see also Center for Democracy and
Technology (visited Nov. 19, 1998) <http:www.cdt.org/
crypto/> (explaining that 40-bit and even 56-bit encryption
The key escrow software "will receive favorable
consideration provided that, prior to the export
or reexport, a key recovery agent satisfactory to
BXA has been identified.., and security policies
for safeguarding the key(s)7 1 or other material/
information required to decrypt cipher
text.., are maintained after export or reexport as
required by the EAR.'" 7 2 If the software received a
favorable recommendation, then manufacturers
of encryption software were not limited to any
particular key length, 73 and they would have been
permitted to export their products to nearly all
destinations74 throughout the world.75
The third licensing method concerned non-re-
covery encryption items with up to a 56-bit key
length. 76 Manufacturers could have exported
non-recovery encryption software not exceeding a
56-bit key length in exchange for a "good faith ef-
fort by the producer to promote key recovery
products and infrastructure. '77 In addition, ex-
porters must have submitted an acceptable time
frame and business plan to the BXA for review. 78
The exporter had a two-year transition period to
"develop, produce, and/or market encryption
items and services with recoverable features." 79
The permit needed to be renewed every six
months; 0 the renewal process was dependent on
how well the applicant adhered to the time frame
technology will not provide adequate security because re-
searchers have cracked 56-bit codes in 56 hours with a
machine that only cost $250,000).
69 See id. See also The Risks of Key Recovery, supra note 31
(analyzing the fundamental properties of key escrow and the
technical risks, costs, and implications of using such a sys-
tem).
70 See Encryption Items Transferred, 61 Fed. Reg. at
68,574.
71 See Baker, supra note 8; Stender, supra note 9-10; High
Tech Dictionary, supra note 9.
72 See Encryption Items Transferred, 61 Fed. Reg. at
68,574.
73 See id.
74 See id. (prohibiting exports to Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya,
North Korea, Syria, and Sudan under the International Traf-
fic in Arms Regulations, because they are suspected of sup-
porting terrorist activities).
75 See id.
76 See id.
77 See id.
78 See Encryption Items Transferred, 61 Fed. Reg. at
68,574 (explaining that the business and marketing plan
must detail the exact steps to be taken to implement a key
recovery system by the designated tine).
79 See id.
80 See id. (stating that the license exception is not auto-
matically renewed).
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of the detailed plan submitted by the company.8 1
The fourth method handled other encryption
issues.82 The policy in effect prior to the issuance
of this rule remains the regulatory scheme for all
other encryption products. 8 3 Exporters may apply
for a license through the BXA, but each applica-
tion will be reviewed on a case-by-case basis.8 4
III. LAW ENFORCEMENT'S DESIRE FOR
STRONG REGULATION OF
ENCRYPTION EXPORTS
Pressure by the government to regulate the ex-
port of encryption flows from two main sources:8 5
(1) law enforcement organizations concerned
with gathering evidence of criminal activity, such
as the Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI") or
the police;8 6 and (2) interests, concerned with
gathering intelligence information concerning
national security, such as the National Security
Agency ("NSA") .17 Although law enforcement or-
ganizations understand the importance and ne-
cessity of the worldwide exportation of advanced
encryption technology, a fear remains that if cer-
tain controls are not placed on such technology,
then law enforcement's ability to capture
criminals and terrorists or thwart their plans will
greatly diminish.8 8 The need to protect the
United States' national security and foreign policy
interests are indeed legitimate; therefore, a com-
promise between the government and the com-
81 See id.
82 See id. The fourth licensing arrangement is concerned
with the distribution and warehousing of such technology.
See id. Any other changes in policy will be made on a case-by-
case basis. See id.
83 See id.
84 See Encryption Items Transferred, 61 Fed. Reg. at
68,575.
85 See Baker, supra note 8, at 301.
86 See id.
87 See id.
88 See FBI report, supra note 4, at 1.
89 See NRC report, supra note 14, at 6 (explaining that
encryption is not an industry or law enforcement crisis;
rather, it is a policy crisis which must be solved).
90 See id. at 4 (concluding that the current policy dealing
with encryption is not satisfactory; therefore, a compromise
must be reached between the software industry and law en-
forcement).
91 See Evans, supra note 60, at 485.
92 See FBI Report, supra note 4, at 5 (referring to Aldrich
Ames, a spy for the former Soviet Union, who encrypted the
computer files delivered to them).
93 See id at 6 (referring to Ramzi Yousef, mastermind of
the World Trade Center bombing, who encrypted his com-
puter industry needs to be negotiated.89 A ques-
tion arises as to what extent the government
should accommodate law enforcement organiza-
tion's wants.90
The NSA is strongly opposed to any relaxation
of export controls on encryption software because
such encryption technology may facilitate ter-
rorists' efforts in conducting targeted attacks
against U.S. interests.9 1 The Aldrich Ames case 92
and Ramzi Yousef case9 3 are often cited as exam-
ples of criminals who have used encryption tech-
nology as a means to avoid revealing their crimi-
nal activity.9 4
The FBI firmly believes that criminals will in-
creasingly use encryption technology as a tool in
perpetrating their crimes.9 5 Therefore, in order
to fulfill its "responsibility for protecting public
safety and national security,"9 6 the FBI argues for
key recovery technology that allows "immediate
access to the plaintext of encrypted criminal-re-
lated data ''9 7 provided they have obtained a law-
ful court order.9 8
The FBI is not only interested in obtaining the
keys to encryption codes to monitor international
criminal activity, but it also wants to monitor do-
mestic criminal activity.99 Presently, domestic use
of the strongest encryption technology is permit-
ted without any key recovery system in place.'00
The FBI is pressuring the Clinton Administration
to mandate such systems for both domestic and
puter files outlining the details of a plan to destroy U.S. com-
mercial airliners).
94 See id at 5.
95 See id. (explaining that in a 1993 survey conducted as
part of a National Institute of Justice Report, 28.4% of state
and local law enforcement agencies responding encountered
encryption technology being used as a way to conceal crimi-
nal activity, and an additional 23.9% anticipated such coun-
termeasures being used).
96 See id. at 7.
97 See id.
98 See id. at 5 (explaining that lawfully intercepted com-
munications will be useless in solving and thwarting crimes if
the information is not immediately accessible).
99 Congressional Research Service, No. 96039: Encryp-
tion Technology (updated Sept. 1998) [hereinafter CRS Re-
port]. See also, FBI Report, supra note 4, at 5. The FBI would
like to control domestic use of cryptography because it be-
lieves that such technology will be used to conceal domestic
criminal activities like illegal drug trafficking, child pornog-
raphy, and domestic terrorism. See id.
100 See CRS Report, supra note 99 (explaining that no do-
mestic regulation now exists, though FBI Director Louise
Freeh has testified that some domestic use restrictions should
be implemented.)
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international users of encryption software. 101
The FBI asserts four main reasons for its pol-
icy.' 0 2 First, the key to the encryption algorithm
will remain in the hands of the FBI or a trusted
third party, 10 3 thereby providing users with the
knowledge that their communications will not be
subject to unauthorized disclosure to law enforce-
ment officials or illegal "hacker-type"'1 4 attack. 10 5
Second, a specific legal process must be followed
to seize the encrypted information.'0 6 Third, a
lawful investigation could be conducted without
the knowledge of the suspects.' 0 7 Fourth, law en-
forcement officials at the state, local and federal
levels have the technical ability to immediately
decrypt electronically encrypted information.' 0 8
The FBI asserts that such a policy is the appropri-
ate balance between the public safety needs of the
country and the needs of the software industry.'0 9
IV. THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION'S
GRADUAL CONCESSION TO AND
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COMPUTER
SOFTWARE INDUSTRYS PREFERRED
ENCRYPTION POLICY
A. The Clinton Administration's Policy
In its inception, the Clinton Administration's
policy towards encryption was largely shaped by
law enforcement organizations and agencies re-
sponsible for national security. 110 Though the Ad-
ministration does not support domestic controls
101 See FBI Report, supra note 4, at 7 (claiming that im-
plementing these systems is the best way for law enforcement
to protect the public safety.)
102 See id.
103 See Baker, supra note 8, at 292 (defining what the re-
quirements are to be a trusted third party).
104 See United States v. Riggs, 739 F. Supp. 414, 423 (N.D.
Ill. 1990) (stating that the term "hacker" is defined as an indi-
vidual involved with the unauthorized access of computer sys-
tems by various means).
105 See FBI Report, supra note 4, at 7
106 See id. (explaining that a request for encrypted infor-
mation would be subject to public scrutiny and accountability
thereby assuring that no abuse of power occurs).
107 See id. (explaining that the confidentiality of an inves-
tigation would not be compromised).
108 See id.
109 See id. See also NRC Report, supra note 14, at 81 (ex-
plaining that law enforcement's ability to obtain information
is a key element in both prosecutions and investigations).
110 See CRS Report, supra note 99.
111 See id.
112 See id. The government policy would require placing
a special semi-conductor device, the "Clipper chip," into all
on the use of encryption technology, it did at-
tempt to steer policy towards the use of key recov-
ery systems by "using the indirect route of export
controls to influence what types of encryption
products are available.'
In April 1994, the first initiative, known as the
"Clipper Chip" policy,1 12 encouraged the software
industry to voluntarily use key recovery systems
and governmental key recovery agents. 113 The in-
dustry strongly objected, primarily based on the
fact that the government would hold the keys. 114
The Clinton Administration eventually aban-
doned this policy and agreed to discuss other op-
tions with industry leaders. 115
In July 1994, the second Administration policy
encouraged the industry to develop key recovery
systems voluntarily; this policy created the
"trusted third party" concept, thereby removing
the keys from government entities. 116 The
software industry continued to object to a key-re-
covery system as well as the export controls, be-
cause the government did not relax the controls
to their satisfaction. 17
After the two unsuccessful attempts at reaching
a compromise, Vice President Gore released a
statement on May 20, 1996, detailing the particu-
lar changes to encryption policy under considera-
tion by the Administration."" These changes in-
clude: the replacement of the term "key escrow"
with the term "key recovery." 119 The concept of a
"trusted third party" was also expanded to allow
government computers. See also Evans, supra note 60, at 483-
84. The signals from these devices are encrypted as they are
sent to the receiver which must also be equipped with the
device. See id. The encryption algorithm has 80-bit strength.
See id. During the manufacturing process, each chip is di-
vided into two parts and distributed to two government agen-
cies, which law enforcement officials may obtain after being
issued the proper order. See id.
113 See CRS Report, supra note 99.
114 See id. (explaining that many consumers would not
purchase encryption software if they knew the United States
government had access to the decryption keys).
115 See id. See also A History of Clinton Administration En-
cryption Policy Initiatives (visited Nov. 19, 1998) <http://
www.cdt.org/crypto/admin/initiatives.html> (analyzing and
critiquing the President's "Clipper Chip" policy); see also NRC
Report, supra note 14, at 171 (describing the key technical
attributes of the "Clipper Chip" initiative).
116 See CRS Report, supra note 99 (stating that some de-
tractors of the program referred to it as "Clipper II").
117 See id.
118 See id.
119 See id. (explaining that the term "key escrow" was
identified with government control of the keys whereas "key
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an organization or the company itself to hold the
key or rather "self escrow."'120 These proposed
changes were eventually implemented through
President Clinton's November 15, 1996, Executive
Order.1 21
Additional evidence of a change in the Clinton
Administration's policy surfaced during March
and April 1998. Vice President Gore wrote a letter
to Senator Tom Daschle expressing the Adminis-
tration's desire to enter into a good-faith dialogue
with the computer industry in order to find a bal-
anced approach to encryption policy without forc-
ing a legislative solution.' 22 In the letter, the Vice
President also hinted that the possibility of re-
laxing the export controls existed. 1 23 In April
1998, the Secretary of Commerce' 24 and the Un-
dersecretary of Commerce' 25 made public state-
ments foreshadowing a change in the existing pol-
icy.
B. Major Changes Since 1996
On May 8, 1997, one of the first changes in pol-
icy by the Administration was directed toward
recovery" would be identified as a way to recover lost, stolen,
or corrupted keys).
120 See id. See also The Risks of Key Recovery, supra note
31 (claiming that "self-escrow" systems, where companies
hold the keys, must "provide sufficient insulation between
the recovery agents and the key owners to avoid revealing
when decryption information has been released").
121 See Exec. Order No. 13,026, supra note 1, at 58,767.
122 See CRS Report, supra note 99 (describing Vice Presi-
dent Gore's letter to Senator Daschle). See also Jeri Claus-
ing, Core Letter Seems to Soften Stance on Encyption, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 5, 1998, at D4.
123 See CRS Report, supra note 99.
124 See Jeri Clausing, Commerce Secretary Seeks Compromise
on Encryption, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 16, 1998, at D5 (summarizing
Secretary Daley's comments which claimed that the Adminis-
tration's policy towards encryption was a failure.)
125 See CRS Report, supra note 99 (summarizing Under-
secretary Reinsch's comments that the government was devel-
oping a plan in conjunction with industry leaders and that
legislation was not needed to resolve differences). Such a po-
sition was a change from 1997, when he announced a de-
tailed outline of proposed legislation under consideration by
the Administration. See id.
126 U.S. Eases Export Ban on Encrypted Financial
Software Programs, 16 No. 11 Banking Pol'y Report 9 (1997).
127 See id.
128 See id.
129 See Mark Hendrickson, Industry Wins Hard-Fought Bat-
tle on Encryption, Sec. Indus. News, July 13, 1998, at 7; see also
Maria V. Georgianis, Commerce Dept Eases Export Rules on
Banks'Encryption Pdts, Dow Jones News Serv., July 7, 1998, at
16:48:00. Securities firms were involved in negotiations with
the Department of Commerce when the export policy
banks and other financial institutions. 12 6 Banks
that conduct international transactions are now
allowed to use the most powerful encryption tech-
nology available without a key recovery system in
place. 27 The Clinton Administration reasoned
that such institutions are "subject to explicit legal
requirements and have shown a consistent ability
to provide appropriate access to transaction infor-
mation in response to an authorized enforcement
request .... ."12'1 In July 1998, this policy was ex-
tended to include securities firms. 129 These finan-
cial institutions are allowed to use advanced en-
cryption technology in the forty-five countries
which have acceptable money-laundering laws ac-
cording to U.S. standards.' 30
One of the most dramatic policy changes oc-
curred on September 16, 1998.'13 Vice President
Gore announced that the licensing requirements
implemented only two years ago by the BXA had
been totally restructured. 13 2 In a significant pol-
icy shift, the government, after a one-time initial
review, now allows the mass marketing of 56-bit
encryption technology, as opposed to only 40-
bit.133 Surprisingly, the Administration also elimi-
changed for banks and other institutions. See id. At the time,
securities firms were not considered financial institutions
under the Commerce Department's definition. See id. The
FBI was originally against allowing securities firms an exemp-
tion for fear of setting too broad a precedent. See id. After
further negotiations, it was decided that securities firms
should be exempt. Id.
130 See Hendrickson, supra note 126, at 7; see also Coun-
tries Eligible to Receive General Purpose Encryption Com-
modities and Software Under License Exception, 63 Fed.
Reg. 50156 (announcing that Anguilla, Antigua, Argentina,
Aruba, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Barbados, Belgium, Bra-
zil, Canada, Croatia, Denmark, Dominica, Ecuador, Finland,
France, Germany, Greece, Hong Kong, Hungary, Iceland,
Ireland, Italy, Japan, Kenya, Luxembourg, Monaco, Nether-
lands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, St. Kitts &
Nevis, St. Vincent/Grenadines, Seychelles, Singapore, Spain,
Sweden, Switzerland, Trinidad & Tobago, Turkey, Uruguay
and the United Kingdom are the countries eligible to receive
the encryption software).
' 3 See John Simmons & David Bank, Restrictions Are Re-
laxed on Encryption Exports, WALL ST. J., Sept. 17, 1998, at A3;
see also Elizabeth Corcoran, U.S. to Relax Encryption Limits,
WASH. POST, September 17, 1998, at C4.
132 See Press Briefing by the Vice-President, Deputy Chief
of Staff John Podesta, Principal Associate Deputy Attorney
General Robert Litt, Assistant Director of the FBI Carolyn
Morris, Under Secretary of Commerce William Reinsch, Dep-
uty Secretary of Defense John Hamre, and Deputy National
Security Advisor Jim Steinberg at 2 [hereinafter Press Brief-
ing] (announcing the specific change in policy during a
question and answer period with the press).
133 See id. But see supra Part II.C. (discussing previous ex-
port licensing requirements). The Center for Democracy
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nated the requirement that companies create and
implement a key recovery system.13 4 For those
companies that do choose to export key recovery
technology, it is no longer necessary to report in-
formation to a key recovery agent.
135
The new policy allows other sectors to use any
bit and any length encryption technology in their
routine business operations worldwide) 36 These
sectors include insurance companies,1 37 health
and medical organizations, 38 subsidiaries of U.S.
firms13 9 and on-line merchants.1 40 When com-
pared to the regulations implemented only two
years ago, it becomes obvious that the computer
software industry has wielded its power and con-
vinced government officials that such a dramatic
change in policy was necessary. This shift by the
Administration demonstrates a willingness to
restructure policy in a manner that favors the se-
curity needs of the business community.
V. WHY THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION
POLICY WILL CONTINUE TO CHANGE
A. Loss of Competitive Edge
In 1996, the pre-packaged software industry was
and Technology claims that 56-bit technology is still not ade-
quate to protect one's security. Center for Democracy and
Technology, New Administration Controls Leave Individual Pri-
vacy Concerns Unanswered, Sept. 16, 1998 (citing a group of
California researchers who broke a 56-bit length encryption
program in only 56 hours).
134 See Press Briefing, supra note 132, at 6. See also supra
Part II.C. (Describing the previous administrative guide-
lines).
135 See Press Briefing, supra note 132, at 6.
136 See id.
137 See Fact Sheet: Administration Updates Encryption
Policy, Sept. 16, 1998 [hereinafter Fact Sheet] (stating that
insurance companies will be treated like banks and financial
institutions allowing them to export to the same approved
countries).
138 See Fact Sheet, supra note 137, at I (explaining that
civilian government health agencies are to be included, but
biochemical/pharmaceutical manufacturers are not in-
cluded in the definition).
139 See Statement by the Press Secretary: Administration
Updates Encryption Policy, Sept. 16, 1998 (stating that com-
panies headquartered in the United States can now use ad-
vanced encryption technology to communicate with foreign
subsidiaries, except those located in the seven restricted ter-
rorist countries).
140 See Fact Sheet, supra note 137, at 1 (stating that on-
line merchants for client server applications may use the ad-
vance encryption technology to aid in securing electronic
transactions between the consumers and merchants).
141 See Organization for Economic Cooperation & Devel-
opment, Measuring Electronic Commerce: International
estimated to be worth $109.3 billion and is ex-
pected to double to $221.9 billion by the year
2002.141 The United States traditionally domi-
nates this market, but as the software industry
continues to become ever more international, the
United States must fight to keep its competitive
edge.' 42 Analysts argue that the American encryp-
tion export policies place companies at risk of los-
ing $60 billion in the global software market 43
because international software companies have
the opportunity to export much stronger encryp-
tion technology than U.S. companies.14 4 Many
foreign countries do not have regulations as strict
as the United States; therefore, they are able to
exploit this weakness and increase their share of
the market.' 45 Whereas U.S. companies, until just
recently, only freely exported encryption software
up to 40-bit strength, 14 6 many foreign countries
could freely export up to 128-bit strength
software. 147 As a result, American policy actually
benefits foreign competitors to the detriment of
U.S. software manufacturers. 1 48
Trade in Software 222 (1998) [hereinafter OECD Report].
142 See id.
143 See Dinh, supra note 14, at 391. Foreign software
companies are able to export encryption as strong as 128-bits
without restriction. See id. An estimated 35 million customers
and 190,000 businesses are connected to the Internet. See id.
If businesses cannot assure its customers that their transac-
tions are secure, then the consumer will go to a business that
can provide that protection, i.e. a foreign company. See id.;
see also Americans for Computer Privacy ("ACP") [hereinafter
ACP] (visited Oct. 30, 1998) http://www.computerprivacy.
org/choice.cgi (explaining that U.S. export restrictions
could prevent 200,000 high-skill, high-wage jobs from being
created).
144 See Dinh, supra note 14, at 391.
145 See ACP, supra note 143; see also Evans, supra note 60,
at 481-82. Russia's constitution forbids any restrictions on
the use of cryptography. Id. at 482. Also, in European coun-
tries such as Germany, France and Switzerland, the export of
encryption technology is "fairly routine." Id.
146 See Aarons, supra note 18, at 21.
147 See Dinh, supra note 14, at 391.
148 See Edmund L. Andrews, U.S. Restrictions on Exports
Aid German Software Maker, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7, 1997, at DI.
(reporting that Brokart Informationssysteme G.m.b.H., a
German software company, has created a very profitable busi-
ness selling strong encryption software to companies like
America Online, Netscape Communications, Microsoft and
others because the United States government does not allow
American companies to export powerful data scrambling
technology). The President's Export Council Subcommittee
on Encryption ("PECSENC") reported that in the past four
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B. Easy to Avoid Regulations
Numerous U.S. international companies, dis-
couraged by government regulations, are attempt-
ing to skirt U.S. encryption policy by forming for-
eign ventures. 49 Such ventures will allow them to
develop, manufacture and export powerful data
scrambling technology without regard to the U.S.
export policy. 150 Network Associates Inc., a data-
security software retailer based in Santa Clara,
California, for example, is conducting business
through a Dutch subsidiary in order to sell their
data security software.1 51 As a result of this out-
sourcing, it is estimated that the United States
could forfeit 200,000 jobs to foreign competition
by year 2000.152
Encryption technology is also widely distributed
through illegal means. A personal use exemption
exists that allows U.S. citizens and permanent resi-
dents to travel abroad with encryption hardware
and software. 153 Although guidelines are in place
for travel with such equipment, no definitive
means exist to determine if a product is illegally
exported or not, thereby enabling the illicit trans-
portation of the software.154 This is also easily ac-
complished by sending the software to foreign
countries via a modem.15 5 For the government to
assert that regulating the export of encryption
technology will prevent foreign nations or individ-
uals from acquiring these products is clearly un-
realistic.
years, Brokart has grown to over 250 employees and has of-
fices in numerous countries including the United States.
President's Export Council Subcommittee on Encryption Findings,
Sept. 18, 1998 [hereinafter PECSENC Findings]. Encryption
is only 10 % of Brokart's revenue. See id. The company ex-
panded by offering support for other forms of electronic
commerce, thereby acquiring a larger share of the electronic
software market. See id. The report also claims that Brokart's
success foreshadows "a weakening of the U.S. position as a
leader in electronic commerce generally." See id.
149 See Dan Goodwin, True Tales from the Encrypt,
LEGAL TIMES, Apr. 21, 1997, at 2; see also PECSENC Findings,
supra note 148, at 2. Many computer software manufactures
are combining foreign encryption technology with U.S. com-
mercial applications. See id. The result is that U.S. compa-
nies have encouraged the advancement of encryption devel-
opment outside the United States. See id. In fact, German,
Swiss, Canadian, Russian, and Israeli manufactures of encryp-
tion software have all "benefit[t]ed from this unintended
consequence of U.S. encryption policy." See id.
150 See Goodwin, supra, note 149, at 2.
151 See Network Associates Skirts Encryption-Export Rules,
AsIAN4 WALL ST. J., Mar. 23, 1998, at A18.
152 See Mike Tonsing, Deciphering the Encryption Debate, 45
Fed. Law. 20 (May 1998) (citing information released by the
C. The Market Will Sort It Out
The Clinton Administration stated that the best
way to allow Internet commerce to expand is by
allowing the private sector to determine how it
will operate. 156 The President directed "all execu-
tive departments and agencies to promote efforts
domestically and internationally to make the In-
ternet a secure environment for commerce. 15 7
Experts agree with the specific application of this
policy towards the encryption debate. 158 A panel
set up by President Clinton to study encryption
policy explained that "reliance on users choices
and market forces is generally the most rapid and
effective way to promote the widespread utiliza-
tion of any new and useful technology."' 59 These
experts concluded that mass use of encryption
technology is in our national interest; therefore,
encryption policy should align itself with market
forces. 160
The government must meet the responsibility
of enhancing public safety and national security,
but the requirements it imposes should not be so
burdensome as to hinder the development of
products that incorporate encryption technol-
ogy. 16 1 The market will determine if a demand
exists for technologies like escrow encryption sys-
tems.162 As businesses have already shown, they
generally maintain a voluntary key recovery plan
in the case of a forgotten password, misplaced in-
formation or other possible mistakes. 163
Americans for Computer Privacy).
153 See Baker, supra note 8, at 300.
154 See Evans, supra note 60, at 490.
155 See id.
156 See Rajiv Chandrasekaran, Don't Regulate or Tax In-
ternet, Urges Presidential Report, THE COMMERCIAL APPEAL
(Memphis), June 30, 1997, at Al.
157 Memorandum on Electronic Commerce, 33 WEEKLY
CoMP. PREs. Doc. 1006, at 1009 (1997).
158 Cf NRC Report, supra note 14, at 7 (explaining that
the committee was compromised of individuals with an ex-
tensive background in government service, computer tech-
nology, cryptography, communications, law enforcement, in-
telligence, civil liberties, national security, diplomacy and
international trade).
159 Id at 7.
160 See id. (stating that cryptography now has more im-
portant non-governmental interests and is disconnected with
market reality and the needs of the private sector).
161 See OECD Report, supra note 141, at 222.
162 Cf NRC Report, supra note 14, at 7 (explaining that
customers will consider the costs and benefits of a key escrow
system and then make a determination if it fits their needs).
163 See Dinh, supra note 14, at 394.
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D. Deregulation Aids Law Enforcement
Law enforcement agencies claim that the in-
creased use of encryption technology will hinder
effective policing and protection of the public.164
This allegation, though correct, must not be the
sole reason for strict regulation of encryption
software. 165 Encryption will aid law enforcement
in its efforts to prevent crime.166 Cryptography
protects a company's trade secrets, which in turn
diminishes the likelihood that a competitor will
commit economic espionage, which will then aid
law enforcement.' 67 Also, encryption technology
can secure "nationally critical information systems
and networks against unauthorized penetration,"
thereby helping to protect national security. 16
The export of encryption technology will also
aid law enforcement in a broader sense. 169 Be-
cause domestic companies supply most of the en-
cryption to foreign nations, the United States is
able to keep abreast of how commercial encryp-
tion technology is developing. 170  Monitoring
commercial development is an easier task when
U.S. companies are the primary suppliers of cryp-
tographic software as opposed to foreign suppli-
ers. 171 Also, if U.S. companies abroad are not al-
lowed the same strength of encryption software
available to their domestic counterparts, these
companies will be forced to buy from foreign ven-
dors, who may be persuaded by their government
164 See FBI Report, supra note 4, at 2.
165 Cf NRC Report, supra note 14, at 9.
166 See id. at 37(explaining that encryption provides law-
abiding businesses with a way to help prevent crimes from
occurring); see also Kenneth Flamm, Deciphering the Cryptogra-
phy Debate, PoLIcY BRIEF No. 21, July 1997, at 4 (stating that
law enforcement recognizes that encryption technology
helps prevent electronic crimes, but they still argue for
strong controls).
167 See NRC Report, supra note 14, at 8; see also Thinh
Nguyen, Cryptography, Export Controls, and the First Amendment
in Berstein v. United States, 10 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 667, 670
(stating that U.S. corporations lose more economic and in-
dustrial information by illegal interceptions of business
secrets than any other way).
168 See NRC Report, supra note 14, at 3.
169 See id.
170 See id. at 8; see also Flamm, supra note 166, at 4 (argu-
ing that if American encryption technology dominates the
market than American technologists will be able to better as-
sist law enforcement because they will be more familiar with
the domestic products as opposed to unfamiliar and poorly
understood foreign encryption software).
171 See NRC Report, supra note 3, at 156 (claiming that
monitoring the development of commercial encryption
software aids traditional national security interest); see also
Flamm, supra 166, at 4 (stating that the economic success of
to sell weak or faulty encryption software to those
U.S. companies. 17 2 If these foreign vendors were
to obtain a substantial market share, then the se-
curity of U.S. companies would be greatly com-
promised. 173
E. Helping Law Enforcement Cope with
Encryption
Changing technologies forced law enforcement
organizations and intelligence organs of the gov-
ernment to modify their policies throughout the
years; encryption will be no different. 174 One so-
lution to help law enforcement cope with the
widespread use of encryption technology is to leg-
islate strict penalties for persons who use encryp-
tion for illegitimate or illegal purposes. 7 5 Obvi-
ously, the advantage to such a proposal is that the
legislation focuses on individuals using encryption
unlawfully rather than individuals using it for le-
gitimate purposes.176
Investment in research and development re-
garding rapid technological change is another
creative and productive way to assist law enforce-
ment.177 Creating a technical center to assist law
enforcement agencies without the expertise and
resources to battle technological crime is another
example of how police may pursue the criminal
without punishing the innocent.178  Inevitably,
the U.S. software industry is a critical and integral part of ef-
fective national security policy).
172 See NRC Report, supra note 14, at 156; see also Flamm,
supra note 166, at 4 (claiming that strong encryption ad-
vances national security interest whether the codes are break-
able or not, because the political adversaries of the U.S. will
most likely not have the ability to penetrate and acquire vital
national security information).
173 See NRC Report, supra note 14, at 156.
174 See id. at 10 (explaining that law enforcement and na-
tional security authorities have adapted quite well to chang-
ing technological environments).
175 See id. at 12.
176 See id.; see also Flamm, supra note 166, at 4. Other
problems exist besides random individuals using encryption
for illegal purposes. Id. For example, there is a fear that
members of the law enforcement community will be tempted
to abuse their power with respect to the access of decrypted
information. Id. Therefore, "clear guidelines and strict ac-
countability" must be implemented to assure that such abuse
does not occur. Id.
177 See NRC Report, supra note 14, at 12.
178 See id. at 12 (explaining that a technical center
should be established to aid federal, state, and local officials
burdened with the task of solving highly sophisticated tech-
nological problems); see also FBI Report, supra note 3, at 6.
The FBI created the Computer Analysis and Response Team
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cryptography will play a substantial role in all
transactions over the Internet, but it is unlikely to
happen in the immediate future. 79 Now is the
most opportune time for the U.S. to study the ef-
fects of a relaxed regulatory scheme for encryp-
tion, enabling the national security authorities
sufficient time to cope with a new technical real-
ity.180
F. Mounting Political Pressure
Though the battle to loosen encryption regula-
tions has been fought mainly between the govern-
ment and the actual software industry, many in
the computer industry are now trying to increase
public awareness in order to assert political pres-
sure on the Clinton Administration.' 8 1 Americans
for Computer Privacy ("ACP"), a group of ninety
companies, including Microsoft, Intel and Sun
Microsystems, are engaged in a $2 million adver-
tising campaign in an attempt to educate and mo-
tivate the public about the national cryptography
policy.'8 2 The computer industry is lobbying to
ease export restrictions and is also focusing on the
government's refusal to abandon the idea that all
encryption keys should be stored, such goals have
been partially realized by the latest shift in the Ad-
ministration's policy.18 3 In an effort to bypass the
administration, the ACP is hoping that the ad
campaign will encourage citizens to contact Con-
("CART") which is responsible for "providing assistance in
law enforcement investigations where computer generated or
stored magnetic media has been obtained pursuant to search
and seizure." Id.
179 Cf Flamm, supra note 166, at 3 (suggesting that en-
cryption is slowly becoming a cheaper and more common
practice in the government and the private sector, but has yet
to reach the individual user in a significant manner).
180 See id.
181 John Simons, Silicon Valley Lobs Populist Ads in Encryp-
tion Battle, WALL ST. J., July 21, 1998, at A16.
182 See id. The ad campaign will include TV commercials
on a few local stations in metropolitan areas and the cable
stations CNN, CNBC, and MSNBC. See id. The campaign will
also place ads in national newspapers and put information
on the Internet. See id.
183 See id. To influence citizens' views on encryption pol-
icy, Americans for Computer Privacy have enlisted the serv-
ices of Goddard-Claussen, the creator of the original Harry
and Louise health-care ads that helped destroy President
Clinton's 1993 health-care initiative. See id.; see also Rajiv
Chandrasekaran, Harry and Louise Have a New Worry: Encryp-
tion, WASH. POST, July 28, 1998 at El.
184 See FBI Report, supra note 3, at 7 (describing and
commenting on bills dealing with encryption in the 105'
Congress).
gress in order to persuade them to vote in favor of
one of the numerous bills18 4 dealing with encryp-
tion.18 5
In addition to the ad campaign, another com-
puter industry group is offering the Clinton Ad-
ministration a plan of its own that satisfies the
needs of both law enforcement and software com-
panies.186 The proposed plan allows the technol-
ogy to encrypt the information being sent and
provides for restricted access to the information
"at the beginning and end of each transmis-
sion."18 7 The White House responded to the plan
by stating the government and computer industry
were headed in a "refreshing new direction."' 88
Undoubtedly, this ad campaign and suggested
proposal have had an impact on the Administra-
tion's position as evidenced in the Vice Presi-
dent's press briefing on September 16, 1998 and
will continue to affect encryption policy.
The Clinton Administration is experiencing
political pressures from international organiza-
tions like the Organization for Economic Cooper-
ation and Development 8 9 and the European
Union (EU).19 ° The EU expressed disapproval of
the Clinton Administration's desire to implement
a key escrow system. 191 In fact, some foreign gov-
ernments view the U.S. policy as a potential
method of committing industrial espionage,
though the main EU argument is that it is op-
posed to "imposing a specific technological ap-
185 See Simons, supra note 181 at A16; see also Press Brief-
ing, supra note 132, at 3 (indicating that the ACP was a key
player in shaping the new policy implemented on September
16, 1998).
186 See Ralph T. King and John Simons, Industry Group's
Method May Break a Long Impasse With FBI, WALL ST. J., July 13,
1998, at A16.
187 See id. The information is accessible at certain points,
referred to as "private doorbells" or routers, that direct the
information to a particular point. See id. As the data travels
from point A to point B, it is encrypted. See id. The informa-
tion can be retrieved if the address of the sender or receiver
is known, because the routers can be "programmed to pull
out the message to or from a specific address." See id.
188 See id.; see also Press Briefing, supra note 132, at 7 (stat-
ing that the Clinton Administration endorsed this type of en-
cryption technology and is allowing for its export to "deal
with the development of local area of wide area networks and
the transmission of e-mail and other data networks.")
189 See OECD Report, supra note 141; see alsoJohn Mark-
off, U.S. Rebuffed in Global Proposal For Eavesdropping on the In-
ternet, N.Y. TIMES, March 27, 1997, at Al.
190 See Jennifer L. Schnecker, EU Seen Rejecting U.S. En-
cryption Plan, WALL ST. J., Oct. 8, 1998, at 2.
191 See id.
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proach," (i.e. key escrow systems).1 92 Even mem-
bers of President Clinton's own party are openly
opposing the Administration's policy and believe
that the EU policy will influence the United
States.193 As on-line transactions become increas-
ingly more commonplace, a standardized encryp-
tion policy will provide the security demanded by
foreign nations if they are to expand their inter-
national transactions with U.S. businesses.
VI. CONCLUSION
The original encryption policy implemented
through President Clinton's Executive Order will
continue to undergo significant modifications, as
exemplified by the September 1998 changes. The
software industry will continue to maintain con-
stant political pressure on the Clinton Administra-
192 See id. (stating that the EU is not opposed to law en-
forcement having limited access to data, but having the key
codes stored in escrow where U.S. security or law enforce-
ment agencies could gain access labels the technology as un-
tion to further deregulate the encryption technol-
ogy serving commercial purposes. As encryption
becomes more ubiquitous, law enforcement and
national security entities will be forced to adapt to
changing technology. Prohibiting such beneficial
technology is not and will not be a viable option
for the Administration to pursue. Law enforce-
ment organizations have managed to respond to
rapid technological change in the past, and
should be encouraged to continue to adapt to
new technologies, but should not be allowed to
impede on the development of a profitable U.S.
based market in advanced encryption technology.
These changes will provide the business commu-
nity and the software industry with more than
mere profits. It will provide them with the secur-
ity needed to flourish in a competitive global mar-
ket place.
secure).
193 See id. (quoting Representative Zoe Lofgren (D-Ca-
lif.) as stating that she admires the EU position and believes
that the U.S. policy is flawed).
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